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RECAPTURE OF ECONOMIC RENT
UNDER THE FCMA: SECTIONS 303-304
ON PERMITS AND FEES
William T. Burke*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perceptions of the significance and utility of the Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA)1 depend considerably
upon the perspective of the observer. Some see the FCMA as offering
both the opportunity to establish effective management systems and
the hope that the fishing industry can be benefited and improved.2
Others see the extension of coastal jurisdiction as a disaster to those
components of the United States fleet, such as those devoted to
catching shrimp and tuna, which may face exclusion as a result of
similar extensions by other nations off whose coasts these fishermen
work. In their view, gains to United States coastal fisheries are offset
by losses to United States distant-water fleets.3 Still others recognize
that the Act might provide a capacity for improved management and
a means to enhance the United States fish harvesting industry, but
they find such significant defects in the legislative scheme that these
prospects may be unrealizable. 4 Finally, some observers argue that
the Act in its present form portends disaster for the United States in-
dustry, primarily because it provides a badly flawed system for elimi-
nating common property in fisheries. 5
* Professor of Law and Marine Studies, University of Washington.
1. Pub. L. No. 94-264, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (West
Supp. 1977)).
2. See Magnuson, Tire Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976; First
Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427
(1977).
3. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE & NAT'L OCEAN POLICY STUDY, 94TH CONG.,
2D SEss., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT
OF 1976, at 877-79, 882-84, 886-87 (1976) (statements of Congressmen Van Deer-
fin, Wilson, Burgener, and McCloskey).
4. See Anderson & Wilson, Economic Dimensions of Fees and Access Controls
Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701
(1977).
5. See Bell, World-Wide Economic Aspects of Extended Fishery Jurisdiction Man-
agemnent, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF EXTENDED FISHERIES JURISDICTION 3, 18-19, 24-25
(L. Anderson ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC IMPACTS].
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Critical attention in this context has focused on the issue of recap-
turing economic rent 6 from managed fisheries, and on the provisions
of the Act concerned with the imposition of fees for permits issued to
domestic fishermen. Central to this discussion is section 303(b),7
which provides that any fishery management plan prepared by a Re-
gional Fishery Management Council8 may
(1) require a permit to be obtained from, and fees to be paid to, the
Secretary with respect to any fishing vessel of the United States fishing,
or wishing to fish, in the fishery conservation zone, or for anadromous
species or Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond such zone;
(2) designate zones where, and periods when, fishing shall be lim-
ited, or shall not be permitted, or shall be permitted only by specified
types of fishing vessels or with specified types and quantities of fishing
gear;
(3) establish specified limitations on the catch of fish (based on area,
species, size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass, or
other factors), which are necessary and appropriate for the conserva-
tion and management of the fishery;
(4) prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types
and quantities of fishing gear, fishing vessels, or equipment for such
6. "Economic rent" is a technical term referring to the net economic benefits real-
ized from use of property. However, fisheries are in most instances considered common
property resources because they are open to exploitation by all comers. Because ac-
cess is free, new entrants join the fishery so long as any profit is available. Under these
conditions the resource will be used until the marginal yield is zero. The result is to
dissipate the profit, or rent. A limited-entry system, which is intended to restrict entry
to the fishery and thus to prevent the dissipation of the rent. raises the issue of who
gets the rent. One alternative is to permit the fishermen to retain all the profit. over
and above normal return, made possible by the limited-access system. Another is to
provide for ways to recapture some or all of this profit for the benefit of society as a
whole, including its use for maintenance and improvement of the fishery. Helpful dis-
cussions of this concept are in F. CHRISTY & A. Sco'rr, THE COMMON WEALTH IN
OCEAN FISHERIES 6-16 (1965); Crutchfield, Economic Objectives of Fishery Manage-
ment, in THE FISHERIES--PROBLEMS IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 43, 46-53 (J. Crutch-
field ed. 1965).
The discussion in this article is not concerned with when limited entry is advisable
or with how much rent should be recaptured when such a system is instituted.
7. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA) § 303(b). 16
U.S.C.A. § 1853(b) (West Supp. 1977).
8. The primary responsibility for preparing fishery management plans rests with
eight Regional Fishery Management Councils. Id. § 302(h), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1852(h).
The Secretary of Commerce may prepare a plan only if a Council fails to do so. or if
a Council fails to remedy a plan which has been disapproved by the Secretary. Id. §
403(c)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c)(1). However, a plan prepared by the Secretary
cannot include a limited-entry scheme unless such a scheme is first approved by a ma-
jority of the voting members, present and voting, of the affected Council. Id. §
304(c)(3), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(c)(3).
682
Vol. 52: 681, 1977
Recapture of Economic Rent
vessels, including devices which may be required to facilitate enforce-
ment of the provisions of this Act;
(5) incorporate (consistent with the national standards, the other
provisions of this Act, and any other applicable law) the relevant
fishery conservation and management measures of the coastal States
nearest to the fishery;
(6) establish a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to
achieve optimum yield if, in developing such system, the Council and
the Secretary take into account-
(A) present participation in the fishery,
03) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery,
(C) the economics of the fishery,
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage
in other fisheries,
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery, and
(F) any other relevant considerations; and
(7) prescribe such other measures, requirements, or conditions and
restrictions as are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the
conservation and management of the fishery.
Although section 303(b)(1) of the Act specifically authorizes the use of
certain kinds of permits requiring a fee, section 304(d) provides that
any fees authorized to be charged "pursuant to section 303(b)(1)...
shall not exceed the administrative costs incurred. . . in issuing such
permits." 9 It is this latter section which is the cause of the controversy
over recapture of rent.
Some commentators suggest that this single provision drastically
impairs the utility of the Act because, in their view, it prevents any
collection of revenue from fishermen, other than the administrative
costs of permits. This view appears to be pressed with some vigor in
light of the high probability that if limited-entry schemes, 10 permitted
by section 303(b)(6) of the Act, are put into effect by a Regional
9. Id. § 304(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1854(d) (emphasis added).
10. A "limited-entry scheme" is here defined as one which regulates the level of
fishing effort in a particular fishery", at least in part, for the purpose of improving net
economic returns to the fishermen. Such a scheme also may seek to accrue a value
from the fishery to defray the societal costs of management, including research and
management functions. See Christy, Alternative Entry Controls for Fisheries, in
LIMITED ENTRY INTO COMMERCIAL FISHERIES 86 (J. Mundt ed. 1974) (Institute for
Marine Studies, Univ. of Wash., Pub. No. I.M.S.-UW-75-1) [hereinafter cited as
LIMITED ENTRY]. See generally Note, Legal Dimensions of Entry Fishery Manage-
inent, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 757 (1976). Almost any fishery regulation may re-
strict access in some sense, but usually the purpose is to impose inefficiency in the
fishery rather than to improve economic return.
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Council, they will undoubtedly generate significant surplus revenues.
For example, Professor Frederick Bell has commented:
Any type of user charge for the resource is prohibited by Section
304(d) of the Act . . . .This effectively eliminates an efficient lim-
ited entry scheme involving the taxation of economic rents. It is un-
derstandable that fishermen do not want to be taxed, especially if
profits are at or below normal levels. The purpose of a user's tax (or
fee) is to reduce excessive profits that first must be generated by the
limited entry scheme. 11
He later adds:
[The FCMA] establishes regional management councils to recom-
mend policy with respect to fisheries falling under their purview. The
purpose of these councils is to repair the private market which fails to
allocate capital and labor properly when a common property resource
is involved. . . .The way to repair the market failure is through the
transformation of common property resources into private property
resources....
• ..Limited entry through a stock certificate plan, license fee or
auction of fishing rights will (1) create private property; (2) generate
revenue to finance the management of the fisheries and (3) conserve
the fishery resource. 12
But, according to Professor Bell, the limit on the level of the fee will
prevent adoption of an effective limited-entry scheme. The "crux of
the entire fishery problem"13 will thus remain unresolved and the
Councils will simply use a quota system which will doom "the fishing
industry into economic oblivion."' 4
Dr. Francis T. Christy offers a similar analysis of section 304(d) by
interpreting it to exclude any collection of rent from fishermen. He
declares: "This is the only provision regarding fees charged to do-
mestic fishermen, and it is quite clear that the Act is intended to pro-
hibit the collection of any revenues from fishermen except for those
inconsequential ones associated with the costs of issuing the per-
mits." 15 The basis for this ascription of clear meaning is not disclosed.
11. Bell, supra note 5. at 18 (emphasis added). The Act does not make specific
reference to a tax.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Christy, Limited Access Systems under the Fishery Conservation and Man-
agenent Act of 1976, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS. supra note 5, at 141, 144.
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In a later passage Dr. Christy identifies the impact of granting all eco-
nomic rents to the fishermen rather than capturing some or all for so-
ciety:
[T] his is detrimental to the interests of society because no return is
received from the use of publicly owned resources. It is detrimental to
the interest of the taxpayer because the costs of research, develop-
ment, enhancement, regulation and enforcement will be borne by him
rather than the beneficiaries-the fishermen. And, because these fac-
tors will force the Office of Management and Budget (if not Congress)
to limit the funds for fisheries research and management, the fishing
industry will suffer as well. To complete the catalogue, the consumer's
interests are also likely to be damaged by the Act because of the incen-
tive to exclude foreigners some of whom provide us with low-priced
imports, and to substitute high-priced production by domestic fish-
ermen.
16
The purpose of this brief article is to consider these interpretations
of the Act and to suggest, in contrast, that the Act can and should be
interpreted as preserving some methods of capturing the increased
economic rent that will probably be generated by a limited-entry
scheme. Discussion centers about the terms of the Act itself and the
guidance they provide, the legislative history of the Act, and the re-
moval of ambiguity or uncertainty by reference to the major purposes
sought by the Act.
II. TERMS OF THE ACT
Careful reading of the language employed in sections 303 and 304
creates genuine doubt about the propriety of broadly interpreting the
terms "permit" and "fees" to prohibit all forms of recapturing rent.
The ambiguity and doubt about the scope of these provisions may be
seen in a brief mention of questions to be resolved. The first problem
is whether section 303(b)(1), which specifically allows a fishery man-
agement plan to "require a permit to be obtained. . . with respect to
16. ECONOMIC IMPACTS, supra note 5, at 146. Other observers are not clear that
§ 304(d) of the Act will be interpreted to extend to all forms of recapturing the eco-
nomic rent. See Crutchfield, Evaluation of the Conference by an Economist, in Eco-
NOMIC IMPACTS at 384; Pontecorvo, Johnston, & Wilkinson, Conditions for Effective
Management in the Northwest Atlantic, in ECONOMIC IMPACTS at 65. Professor Crutch-
field adds the creative suggestion that since the administrative costs mentioned in §
304(d) are not defined it should be possible to hire enough help to raise the cost of
entry as high as necessary.
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any fishing vessel of the United States,'17 refers to a vessel permit or is
to be understood as including any permit associated with a United
States fishing vessel. Fisheries regulations restricting access commonly
employ a variety of permits or licenses, such as for a particular type of
gear, for the individual fishermen, or for a vessel itself, and all of these
may be required simultaneously. A license or permit is often circum-
scribed in terms of space, time, species of fish caught, type of vessel,
and characteristics of a vessel, or a combination of these. The indi-
vidual fisherman's permit may be made to depend on a host of factors,
including economic and social conditions affecting individual social
groups and communities. 18 In order to embrace all these modalities
for managing access to a fishery, the term "permit" in section
303(b)(1) requires a very expansive interpretation such that, for exam-
ple, a permit "with respect to any fishing vessel" also means a permit
with respect to a fisherman, a permit with respect to troll gear or purse
seine or gillnet or some other gear, and a permit with respect to a par-
ticular area in relation to a particular species of fish.
An even more difficult feat of liberal interpretation is required in
reference to the term "fees." First, to the extent "fees" in section
303(b)(1) refers only to those payable for a permit, then the questions
in the preceding paragraph are pertinent; that is, are the fees payable
under section 303(b)(1) only those for a vessel permit or also for all
permits and licenses? Assuming the term "fees" is associated with all
forms of permit and licenses, does it also extend to payments without
such connection? A fee can be imposed for management purposes
without reference to issuance of a license or permit, as for catching or
landing a particular amount of a particular stock.19
17. FCMA § 303(b)(1), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(1) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis
added).
18. The Alaska limited-entry law is illustrative. It provides that qualifications for
ranking applicants for initial entry permits are those pertaining to the degree of eco-
nomic hardship which they would suffer from exclusion from the fishery. Standards
for this determination include
(I) degree of economic dependence upon the fishery, including but not limited
to percentage of income derived from the fishery, reliance on alternative occupa-
tions, availability of alternative occupations, investment in vessels and gear;
(2) extent of past participation in the fishery, including but not limited to the
number of years [sic] participation in the fishery, and the consistency of partici-
pation during each year.
ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.250 (1973). These factors are connected with characteristics of
the community and groups to which an applicant belongs. Clearly, availability of al-
ternative occupations, for example, is closely related to the economic and social struc-
ture of the community.
19. Washington State has a catching fee for every person taking fish from state
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The second, and more important, question is whether the term
"fees" extends not only to payments usually labelled as such but also
to all other forms of payments that might be imposed for management
purposes. The limited and precise references to fees in sections
303(b)(1) and 304(d) may be contrasted with the range of methods
that may be employed in a limited-entry scheme as authorized by sec-
tion 303(b)(6). A fee is only one of several methods that may be used
to recapture rent in such a scheme, and a fee for a vessel permit is
only one type of fee that can be employed. Thus, a limited-entry
scheme could be implemented by allocating individual fishermen's
quotas which may be leased or otherwise exchanged. 20 Some limited-
entry laws call for a bonus payment and bidding for access to the
resource.2 1 Others involve the imposition of a tax on catch or on
landings. 22 Other approaches that have been mentioned include a sever-
ance tax,23 an auction of licenses,24 and a method of contracting with
fishermen who would pay the state a portion of the value of the
catch.2 5
In the face of this variety of actual and potential methods for lim-
iting entry by imposing permit requirements and variously named
charges, the use of the terms "permit with respect to a fishing vessel"
and "fees" hardly seems adequate to prohibit all forms of recapturing
rent. Complete prohibition would have referred to permits in a ge-
neric sense to include permits for the individual fishermen and, even
more importantly, permits for particular gear. The choice of one of
waters for commercial purposes. WASH. REV. CODE § 75.32.070 (1976). Limited-entry
provisions for hardshell and geoduck clams also entail payment of a stumpage fee in
addition to other payments. LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 10, at 17 (statement of
Charles E. Woelke, research scientist, Washington State Dep't of Fisheries).
Ohio law provides for payment of a "royalty fee" on certain species taken commer-
cially and for which an allowable catch or quota is established. OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 1533.35(B) (Page 1974).
20. See F. CHRISTY, FISHERMAN QUOTAS: A TENTATIVE SUGGESTION FOR DOMESTIC
MANAGEMENT (Law of the Sea Inst., Univ. of R.I., Occasional Paper No. 19, 1973).
21. Entry into the Washington State subtidal hardshell clam and geoduck fisheries
calls for a bonus bid, a fixed annual lease payment, and a stumpage fee. See note 19
supra.
22. The Alaska limited-entry law provides for an "assessment" of 7% of the gross
value of the annual catch attributed to a permit for the purpose of buying back per-
mits when the optimum number of permits is less than the number outstanding in a
fishery. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.310 (1973). See also Pontecorvo, Johnston, & Wilkinson,
supra note 16 (tax proposal concerning fisheries in the Northwest Atlantic).
23. See Crutchfield, supra note 16.
24. Christy, supra note 15, at 151.
25. See Bromley & Bishop, From Economic Theory to Fisheries Policy: Concep-




these methods rather than another has very different effects on the
fishery and imposes completely different management responsibilities.
Similarly, to rule out all terms of payment as a means of recap-
turing rent, the simple term "fees" in section 303(b)(1) would require
expansion to read: "payments, charges, taxes, bids, royalties, or other
methods of extracting payment from a fisherman." Nothing in the
other language of the Act or in the legislative history, as noted below,
provides a persuasive basis for such an expansive interpretation of
"fees" or, as suggested above, "permit," as these terms appear in sec-
tion 303(b)(1).
Thus, it appears reasonably clear that the section 304(d) limit on
fee levels applies to a limited category of payments out of a number of
possible kinds. Section 303(b)(1) refers either to a vessel permit and
fees associated with a vessel or, at most, to fees associated with var-
ious types of permits that a Council might require. It should not be
read to include other types of payments that are sometimes employed
in fisheries management, such as royalties, quota charges, bids, and
taxes. Such other forms of payment are authorized in the grant of
competence in section 303(b)(6) to set up a limited-access system, as
well as in the "necessary and appropriate" provision of section
303(b)(7).
Because these latter provisions are drafted in general terms, there
might be difficulties in interpreting the FCMA to permit Councils to
include a landing or other tax in a limited-entry plan. Initially the ob-
stacle arises because, if such a tax were challenged, there could be ju-
dicial reluctance to deal with the issue of the power of Congress to
delegate to a federal agency the power to tax. A court might construe
the Act narrowly to forbid a Council from imposing a tax. It is even
conceivable, although unlikely, that a Council decision to levy a
charge on fishermen, whether or not called a tax, might be considered
such and declared unconstitutional. The source of these potential
problems in implementing the Act is suggested by a recent Supreme
Court decision, National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States,2 6 in
which the Court construed a 1952 statute declaring the sense of Con-
gress that benefits provided by any federal agency to any person "shall
be self-sustaining to the full extent possible" and authorizing for this
purpose the head of each federal agency "to prescribe . . . such fee,
26. 415 U.S. 336(1974).
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charge, or price, if any, as he shall determine. . . to be fair and equi-
table taking into consideration direct and indirect cost to the Govern-
ment, value to the recipient, public policy or interest served, and other
pertinent facts. '27 The Federal Communications Commission imposed
an annual fee on cable television companies which was said to ap-
proximate "the value to the recipient" as used in the act.
The question for the Court was whether the general language of the
statute should be construed to permit the agency to impose a tax as
well as a fee. The Court stated:
Taxation is a legislative function, and Congress, which is the sole
organ for levying taxes, may act arbitrarily and disregard benefits be-
stowed by the Government on a taxpayer and go solely on ability to
pay, based on property or income. A fee, however, is incident to a
voluntary act, e.g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant
to practice law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast
station. The public agency performing those services normally may
exact a fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the
applicant, not shared by other members of society. It would be such a
sharp break with our traditions to conclude that Congress had be-
stowed on a federal agency the taxing power that we read 31 U.S.C. §
483a narrowly as authorizing not a "tax" but a "fee." A "fee" con-
notes a "benefit" and the Act by its use of the standard "value to the
recipient" carries that connotation. The addition of "public policy or
interest served, and other pertinent facts," if read literally, carries an
agency far from its customary orbit and puts it in search of rev-
enue in the manner of an Appropriations Committee of the House.28.
The opinion declared that, in light of the reference to the "public
policy or interest served," the assessment might be varied to achieve
different goals, and that "[s] uch assessments are in the nature of
'taxes' which under our constitutional regime are traditionally levied
by Congress. '29 The Court then referred approvingly to the language
in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,30 stating that
Congress cannot "transfer to others the essential legislative functions
with which it is thus vested."3 ' The Court noted, however, that Con-
gress does delegate power to agencies and sets standards to guide their
27. Id. at 337.
28. Id. at 340-41 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted).
29. Id. at 341.
30. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31. Id. at 529.
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determinations, and that in Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,3 2
the Court had upheld delegation of the power to set tariffs, declaring
a delegation is not forbidden if Congress provides in the legislation an
"intelligible principle" to which the agency must conform in setting
the tariff. Then the Court stated: "Whether the present Act meets the
requirement of Schechter and Hampton is a question we do not reach.
But the hurdles revealed in those decisions leads us to read the Act
narrowly to avoid constitutional problems." 33
It is possible the Court meant that Congress could not delegate the
power to tax at all, in which case Congress could not constitutionally
authorize Regional Councils under the FCMA to impose a tax on
catch and landings. 34 But the references to Schechter and Hampton
do not necessarily foreordain judicial prohibition of all delegations of
power; they appear to call for an "intelligible principle" to which the
delegate must conform in the exercise of that power. Thus, if delega-
tion of the power to tax is not to be treated differently from other del-
egations, the question is whether the FMCA provides such a principle
to which a Council must conform in levying a tax as part of a lim-
ited entry scheme.
The provisions of section 303(b)(6) do provide sufficient guidance
for devising a limited-access system which would recapture some of
the rent and which would withstand judicial assessment. The reference
to "economics of the fishery," in particular, calls attention to those
considerations that pertain to distribution of the surplus generated by
limited access. Additional useful direction is to be found in section
301(a)(4):
Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate
between residents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allo-
cate or assign fishing privileges among various United States fishermen,
such allocation shall be (A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen;
(B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and (C) carried
out in such a manner that no particular individual, corporation, or
other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.35
The problem may be illustrated in a concrete setting. Suppose the
32. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
33. 415 U.S. at 342.
34. For a discussion of National Cable, see Freedman, Review: Delegation of
Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 307. 318-29 (1976).
35. FCMA § 301(a)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1851(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977).
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North Pacific Council is asked, as may well happen, to adopt Alaska's
limited-entry law, including its assessment provision, 36 for a specific
fishery. Leaving aside questions about the desirability of this scheme
from other standpoints, what result might be expected if the assess-
ment were challenged as being beyond the Council's authority under
section 303(b)? For the reasons discussed above, a court would be on
solid ground in reading sections 303(b)(6) or 303(b)(7) to authorize
such a charge. Such an interpretation need not run afoul of National
Cable. The various methods of recapturing rent discussed above are
readily distinguishable from the kind of charge the Court thought
might constitute a tax in National Cable,37 hence, the power to tax as
36. See note 22 supra.
37. In National Cable the Court's first concern was the nature of the mechanism
used to recover the value of the benefit conferred. The Court defined a "fee" as "incident
to a voluntary act, e.g., a request that a public agency permit an applicant to practice
law or medicine or construct a house or run a broadcast system." 415 U.S. at 340
(emphasis added). The Court found that for such services an agency "may exact a
fee for a grant which, presumably, bestows a benefit on the applicant, not shared by
other members of society." Id. at 340-41. A "tax," on the other hand, was viewed as
a power which could be exercised "arbitrarily" and would allow an agency to "disre-
gard benefits bestowed by the Government... and go solely on ability to pay, based
on property or income." Id. at 340.
These considerations do not cause difficulty for action under the FCMA, such as
adoption of a catch assessment as in the Alaska law. First, recapture of rent is "inci-
dent to a voluntary act." Second, the very purpose of a charge under the Act is to re-
cover the "benefit bestowed." There is a concrete basis to determine its amount: the
value of the permit. The recapture of some of the extra rettirns a fisherman is receiving
from a limited-entry system, if done nondiscriminatorily, could neither be "arbitrary"
nor in disregard of benefits bestowed by the management authority.
The Court also seemed concerned that allowing the FCC to tax in National Cable
would carry the agency "far from its customary orbit and [put] it in search of reve-
nue." Id. at 341. The "taxes" contemplated in a limited-entry scheme under the FCMA,
however, do not have as an objective the "search of revenue." The Alaska assessment,
for example, is aimed precisely at maintaining the value of the permit. Such charges
are a management device, whose essentiality economists seem to regard as paramount.
Furthermore, and more importantly, the taxes imposed under a limited-entry program,
even if they were to recapture the entire surplus rent accruing to the fishermen, are
not likely to equal the amount expended under the Act for enforcement, management,
etc.-services which directly benefit those persons using the fishery.
The third point of apparent concern to the Court was highlighted in the companion
case to National Cable, FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974), which
construed the same statute. The FPC had imposed an annual assessment against alljurisdictional electric companies. The Court found this to be outside the scope of the
act. The key to the decision was the holding that an agency charging a "fee" must
apply that charge to "identifiable recipients" of the special benefits conferred. The FPC
had charged a general assessment against all utilities. This is not a difficulty under the
FCMA. Taxes would only be imposed on recipients of the benefits. For example, the
Alaska assessment on catches is paid only by the fishermen who benefit from limited
entry in a specific fishery.
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, wrote a separate opinion con-
curring in New England Power's result but dissenting from National Cable. He char-
acterized the Court's opinion as "an attempt to draw metaphysical distinctions between
691
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discussed in that case is not at issue. On the other hand, if the Alaska
assessment were considered a tax, the Act contains sufficient guidance,
or "intelligible principle," to satisfy the constitutional test.38
If National Cable has a lesson in this context it may be that Coun-
cils should seek to assure the viability of methods to recapture rent by
making sure that the methods do not resemble a tax within the con-
ception set out in National Cable. Apparently, semantic distinctions
are important to the Supreme Court, so perhaps it would also be ad-
visable to avoid the term "tax."
Aside from this question about taxes, why is the legislation drafted
to make only partial specific reference to the range of means that
might be used to impose charges on fishermen? There appear to be
several responses to that question. One is that the drafters were intent
on referring to the most common form of fee payment, the one con-
nected with securing a vessel permit. It could reasonably be thought
that because this device is the most important one used for manage-
ment, it was sufficient to refer to it. Another response may be that leg-
islators were unfamiliar with the detailed tools of fishery management
and unaware that their language was partial in its effect, but there is
evidence that this was not the case.39 It is not even inconceivable that
legislators, although aware of the limited reference of the term "fees"
and intending that other charges under such labels as tax, assessment,
and royalty not be precluded under the Act, did not expressly mention
these kinds of charges due to questions of jurisdiction within the Con-
gress. 40 It is noteworthy, at the least, that there is no express prohibi-
tion of other charges and that there is a clear directive to use a limited-
entry scheme which takes into account the "economics of the fishery."
a 'fee' and a 'tax.' " 415 U.S. at 352. This, of course, is even worse than a semantic
distinction, and this author does not go so far.
38. Some of the considerations in the preceding footnote are also relevant when
the issue concerns standards for judging the legality of a delegated power to tax.
39. See note 51 and accompanying text infra.
40. A recent news report suggests this practical reason. In the United States Sen-
ate, consideration of proposed legislation containing provision for a "tax." instead of
or in addition to a fee, must be referred to the Senate Finance Committee. This some-
times causes difficulty. For example, when the Carter administration proposed water-
ways legislation that would impose a tax on barge fuel, rather than a fee of some
kind, it required reference to and approval of the Finance Committee rather than the
Public Works Committee. The choice of terms in that instance probably doomed the
proposed charge because the Chairman of the Finance Committee, Senator Russell
Long of Louisiana, is opposed to such waterways charges, and legislation for that
purpose probably would not be approved in his committee. Washington Post. May 3.
1977, at A5, col. 2. The author is grateful to Francis T. Christy. Jr., for calling his at-
tention to this report.
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Another interpretation is more attractive than any of these because
it is more attuned to the purposes of the legislation. This interpreta-
tion is that whatever section 303(b)(1) refers to by way of permits and
fees, the limit in section 304(d) applies only to such charges as are
made pursuant to section 303(b)(1). Section 303(b)(6), on the other
hand, may be construed to authorize permits and fees as part of an
overall management scheme aimed at limiting entry, and in the event
such a scheme is adopted, the limit applicable to section 303(b)(1) is
not effective.
The argument to -this effect is that section 303(b) spells out a va-
riety of management tools that are available at the discretion of the
Councils and the Secretary. Subsections 1-5 of section 303(b) specifi-
cally identify such tools41 while subsection 6 refers to a management
system that might include both the tools specified in the preceding
subsections and others associated with limited-entry systems. It may
be argued that the reference to a vessel permit and fee in subsection 1
dealt with this particular tool as an independent management measure
divorced from adoption of a limited-access system. In contrast, a
Council is authorized by subsection 6 to set up a system for limiting
access, suggesting a planned, coherent overall access scheme which
might include, inter alia, the limits, restrictions, or conditions referred
to in subparagraphs 1-5. Thus, when incorporated in a limited-access
scheme under subsection 6, rather than as an independent measure
under subsection 1, the fee for a vessel or other permit would not be
subject to the limit specified in section 304(d), because such a fee
would not be adopted pursuant to section 303(b)(1).
This interpretation aids in explaining the apparent anomaly in lim-
iting the level of a fee only by reference to section 303(b)(1). By this
reference, the prohibition of fee level larger than administrative cost
applies only to a fee imposed outside the bounds of a limited-access
system. In such a situation there would very probably be no surplus
rent produced which should be recaptured, and it makes eminent
sense to limit the fee in such a context. On the other hand, under a
41. The subsections refer to such measures as permits and fees with respect to
fishing vessels; designated fishing zones; limitations on catch based on area, species,
size, number, weight, sex, incidental catch, total biomass, or other factors; prohibitions,
limits, requirements, or conditions regarding use of specified types and quantities of
fishing vessels, gear, and equipment; and relevant conservation and management meas-
ures from coastal States nearest the fishery (if consistent with the Act and any other




limited-access system there is every reason to believe a surplus would
be created, and it would be subject to recapture by a fee under section
303(b)(6).
III. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
On the question of recapture of economic rents, it is difficult to get
much guidance from the proceedings in Congress or from the reports
of the House and Senate committees involved, because the final Act's
fee provisions do not resemble those in either the House or Senate bill.
Unfortunately, the report of the conference committee, which recon-
ciled inconsistencies in these versions, does not clarify the meaning
and scope of the fee provisions either. 4 2 Thus, the implications to be
derived from these differences are not easy to draw.
The key relevant provisions in the House bill 43 concerned a limited-
access system, fee payments, a definition of fees, and provision for
their collection. The provision for limited access called for recogni-
tion, "among other considerations," of a variety of enumerated fac-
tors, but conspicuously omitted reference to the value of the privilege
of fishing under limited access. 44 A later provision in the same section,
however, would have permitted a Regional Council to "specify those
licenses, permits or fees. . . which should be required as a condition"
to fishing, and specifically declared that the amount of these "may
vary between domestic and foreign fishermen, between different cate-
gories of domestic fishermen, or between different categories of for-
eign fishermen." 45 The term "license fee" was defined as "any fee
42. Although not explicit, the conference report indicates that the term "permit"
may be narrowly construed, and recapture of rent should be permitted. First, in ana-
lyzing § 303(b)(1), the report states that a management plan can include "a permit
requirement for each vessel engaged in the fishery," thus supporting the conclusion
that the subsection refers to vessel permits only. S. REP. No. 94-711, 94th Cong.. 2d
Sess. 52 (1976). Second, the report states in regard to § 303: "The House and Sen-
ate provisions for this section were not mutually exclusive and the [FCMA's] provi-
sions utilize parts of both versions." Id. at 53. This logically implies that the final ver-
sion agreed upon encompasses no less authority to recapture economic rent than
either the House or Senate bills. Because both bills provided for recapture, the result-
ing inference should be that the Act does also. Finally, the conference report states
that § 304(d) "directs the Secretary to set, by regulation, the level of any fees which
may be changed [sic] under fishery management plans for U.S. fishing vessels. This
level cannot exceed the Secretary's administrative costs in issuing these permits." Id.
This again implies that the limitation is only on fees charged for fishing vessels.
43. H.R. 200, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
44. Id. § 304(b)(3)(B).
45. Id. § 304(b)(3)(E).
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which is imposed on any person under any fishery management plan
implemented under this Act for the privilege of fishing. ' '46 Finally, the
House bill provided that all fees collected from domestic fishermen
were to be used to carry out stock assessment and other research and
development. 47 This provision makes it abundantly clear that the
amount recoverable was intended to be the surplus economic rent, not
just administrative costs, because the recovery of costs could not sup-
port stock assessment or research and development activities.
The Senate bill4s had two provisions concerning permits and fees.
First, it provided for a limited-access system which would recognize,
inter alia, "the value of the fishing privilege. '49 Second, it provided for
a variety of licenses or permits, stating that such may "be issued by
the Secretary as a condition to engaging in any fishery, upon such
terms as may be prescribed, including the payment of fees appropriate
to the value of the fishing license or permit. '50 The Senate bill thus
took into account the full range of permits that would be used in
management and placed no limit on the level of fees.
In concluding that the FCMA prohibits all forms of recapturing
rent, some observers place great weight on the contrast between these ex-
plicit provisions on fees in the House and Senate bills aid the provision
in section 304(d) that a fee under section 303(b)(1) cannot exceed the
administrative cost of its issuance.5 ' The difficulty with this focus of
attention is that most, if not all, emphasis appears to be placed on the
former provisions rather than on those in the FCMA. The result is a
failure to note that, while the broad language on fees in the House and
Senate bills does not appear in the FCMA, the specific language lim-
iting the level of a fee and the provision for a permit and fee are very
precise in reference and do not expressly foreclose all imposition of
fees, licenses, taxes, and charges that can be authorized under more
general provisions of FCMA. The misemphasis further neglects to
note that the FCMA contains different but similarly broad language
which, reasonably construed, allows recapture of rent under a limited
access arrangement.
46. Id. § 306(a).
47. Id. § 306(e).
48. S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
49. Id. § 203(b)(2).
50. Id. § 203(b)(5) (emphasis added).
51. See Christy, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976; Man-
agement Objectives and the Distribution of Benefits and Costs, 52 WASH. L. REV. 657,
666 (1977). See also Christy. supra note 15.
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In its consideration of this legislation, Congress explicitly recog-
nized that permits or licenses are employed in a variety of ways and
that various types of fees or other payments including taxes may be
charged to the fishermen. 52 Hence, the limited terminology in the
FCMA is not there because of unfamiliarity with either the range of
appropriate management tools or the terms to describe them. Further-
more, as noted above, the Act contains language which authorizes,
beyond the explicitly stated discretionary provisions for regulation,
"such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as
are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation
and management of the fishery."5 3 Thus, in spelling out the types of
management tools in section 303(b)(1)-(6), the Act does not exclude
any other tools the Council or Secretary may use so long as they are
considered to be "necessary and appropriate."
One other change in the limited-access provision is noteworthy.
Although the Act drops the reference in the Senate version to recogni-
tion of the value of the fishing privilege, it adds language which
includes reference to this value and to other economic elements by
specifying that a limited-access system should take into account the
"economics of the fishery."54 Specific mention and reiteration of this
factor in the context of limited access lends it unusual weight in view
of the Act's general emphasis upon economic considerations in carry-
ing out its major purposes. It does no violence to language to construe
this phrase as authorizing a management plan containing a limited-
access system requiring from fishermen payments which reflect the
value of that access.
IV. INTERPRETATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
MAJOR PURPOSES OF THE AC I
The foregoing discussion of the relevant provisions in the FCMA
strongly suggests that there is considerable basis for doubt about the
inclusiveness of the term "fees" in sections 303(b)(1) and 304(d). By
itself, as well as in the context of the Act, the term is oddly chosen if it
52. See S. REP. No. 94-416, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1975). reprinted in
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3, at 653. 690-92; H.R. REP. No. 94-445. 94th
Cong.. 1st Sess. 66-69 (1975), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 3. at
1051, 1119, 1121.
53. FCMA § 303(b)(7), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(7) (West Supp. 1977).
54. FCMA § 303(b)(6)(C), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(6)(C) (West Supp. 1977).
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was intended to embrace all taxes, charges, or payments for items
other than a vessel permit. At the very least, the preceding discussion
shows that it is an ambiguous term, and that its reference is unclear and
open to question. In resolving lack of clarity, ambiguity, and doubt,
the principal guide in interpretation is the major purpose of the Act.55
Is this purpose promoted by a broad interpretation of sections
303-304 so as to prohibit every means of collecting rent? Or is the
fundamental objective of the Act better served by a narrower interpre-
tation of these sections which either limits the scope of the relevant
terms "permit" and "fees" or confines the operation of section 304(d)
solely to permits and fees imposed outside a limited-entry system?
In the most general terms, the aim of the Act is to benefit the
United States fishing industry by conserving living resources in the
fisheries zone and by managing them to secure the optimum yield
therefrom. This goal is to be sought through several means: The estab-
lishment of an exclusive fishery management system within a 200-mile
zone (and beyond for certain species); 56 the prevention of overfishing;
the grant of a priority on fishing in the zone to United States vessels to
the extent of their capacity and intention to harvest the resources; 57
the development of under- or non-utilized fisheries; 58 the specification
that the overall goal of management is that of securing the optimum
yield from the fishery;59 and the betterment of the industry through
limiting access to the fishery.60 Throughout, management is to take
into account economic and social considerations in addition to the
biological and ecological health of the living resources and the rele-
vant ecosystem. 61
The most general question is whether the overriding objective of
benefiting the fish-harvesting industry through conservation and
management is furthered, hindered, or unaffected by alternative inter-
pretations of section 304(d). At one level, the answer to this is that the
harvesting segment, or rather a fixed component of it, would signifi-
cantly benefit if the term "fees" is construed to refer to, and therefore
55. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL, & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 156-86 (1967); 2A D. SANDS, STATUTES AND STAT-
UTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.09 (4th ed. 1973).
56. FCMA § 102, 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812 (West Supp. 1977).
57. Id. § 201(d), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(d).
58. Id. § 2(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(6).
59. Id. § 2(b)(4), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(b)(4).
60. Id. § 303(b)(6), 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(6).
61. Id. § 3(18), 16U.S.C.A. § 1802(18).
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to prohibit, all methods of capturing any surplus rent from fishing.
The effect of such a construction would be to permit the surplus to go
to the fishermen who are permitted access to the fishery under a limit-
ed-entry scheme. Wider distribution of enlarged profits would occur
only as a result of later transactions with processors and of the normal
operation of federal and state tax systems.
But such an answer is superficial and reflects exclusively shortrun
considerations. The effect of foreclosing recapture would almost cer-
tainly be a disservice not only to the industry but also to the consumer
and to the taxpayer. Professor Bell believes that use of a quota system,
without the recapture measures he believes prohibited by section
304(d), "will be dooming the fishing industry into economic oblivi-
on." 62 Dr. Christy has written an entire article attempting to catalog
the evils which would ensue from the inability to recapture through
fees or taxes the rent which will be produced by limited-entry sys-
tems. 63 On the assumption that quotas will not be used and that any
payments by way of fee or taxes would not be permitted, he believes
the industry would continue to be afflicted by overcapitalization, inef-
ficiency, reduced opportunities for technological innovation, and loss
of public funds for support of research and management. 64 Conserva-
tion itself would suffer because there would continue to be excessive
fishing pressure on the fish stocks. 65 He also believes that the tax-
paying public and the consumer would incur losses from this develop-
ment.6 6 If these were in fact the consequences, it is not difficult to see
that the fishing industry would be harmed, not benefited, by a prohi-
bition on any method of recapturing the rent from fisheries. Certainly
there could be no serious question that society as a whole would pay a
tremendous cost for permitting a small segment of it to obtain dispro-
portionate benefits.
Among the advantages of recapturing the rent through taxes or
payments of one kind or another would be the provision of major as-
sistance in building a more profitable and attractive industry, the
major goal of the FCMA. Reducing excessive fishing effort might alle-
viate the tendency toward boom or bust which afflicts the harvesting
62. Bell, supra note 5, at 25.
63. Christy. supra note 15.
64. Id. at 150-54.
65. Id. at 153.
66. Id. at 146.
698
Vol. 52: 681, 1977
Recapture of Economic Rent
industry. Matching effort with available resources reduces pressure on
stocks. The viability of the limited-entry system might well be threat-
ened if rent is not recaptured, and the public perceives that individual
fishermen are enriched at public expense. 67 Recapture also helps
maintain access to the fishermen's occupation by younger fishermen
and lends stability to patterns of individual ownership of vessels and
permits by obviating the necessity to rely on corporate funding to af-
ford a vessel or permit.
In this context, the substantial testimony of economists and other
knowledgeable observers is that the Act should provide for a means of
capturing economic rent if it is to succeed in conserving resources or
improving the gain from their exploitation. Failure to provide a means
for recapturing rent will harm taxpayers, the fishing industry, and
consumers, and will virtually guarantee that the Act will be unsuc-
cessful if not a disaster. In the face of this array of expert opinion, it is
indeed difficult to understand why the Act, if it is unclear in this re-
spect, must necessarily be interpreted in a fashion that has such
harmful effects. To the contrary, the interpretation which both bene-
fits the affected interests and promotes the Act's goals is one which
reads the Act to permit collection of rent from the fisherman. Such an
interpretation preserves the discretion of the Regional Councils to se-
lect from the whole array of management tools and to combine those
thought necessary and appropriate to achieve both conservation and
optimum yield.
In these circumstances, it would seem to achieve heights of folly to
dispel uncertainty or ambiguity in meaning either by an interpretation
that a limited-access system cannot recapture rent through a fee or
other payment, or by an interpretation that the term "fees" must be
read as if it also embraced any levying of royalties and taxes, any pro-
67. The following revealing exchange occurred during a discussion of limited en-
try:
Lauber: Finally, society will not allow Limited Entry to continue if the program
creates a class of rich men. We had better find some way of controlling this or
Limited Entry will destroy itself. The people will not tolerate having what they
consider to be a public resource controlled by a small group of people.
Rickey: You are right, I don't think that society will tolerate a club of million-
aires operating on a public resource as they have in the past; but this is not an
insoluble problem.
LIMITED ENTRY, supra note 10, at 60 (exchange between R. Lauber, Manager, Ass'n




vision for bonus bidding or lease payments, and any charges for allo-
cation of quotas. There is simply no justification for such a gratuitous
emasculation of potentially effective legislation.
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